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claims to the "deathtrap," defendants should first ask the state court to
exercise its discretion and provide relief from the rules of the "deathtrap."
Should this relief be denied, defendants must object to the enforcement
of these rules and list the particular claims that they will be prevented
from raising. Both the challenge to the Virginia rules and the reference
to particular claims at risk for default must be properly federalized.
Through these efforts, defendants may be able to preserve both their
substantive claims for future federal review and their challenge to the
validity of the Virginia rules themselves. When these claims, supported
by a clear record, are presented in the federal court system for review, it
is hoped that the federal courts will grant capital defendants the relief
from the "deathtrap" that the Supreme Court of Virginia refuses to
provide.
LEAVING NO STONE UNTURNED: ALTERNATIVE METHODS
OF DISCOVERY IN CAPITAL CASES
BY: TIMOTHY B. HEAVNER
The usual method of obtaining discovery in criminal cases in
Virginia is by motion under Rule 3A: 11 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia' and by motion for all exculpatory evidence in the
possession of the Commonwealth, according to the requirements of
Brady v. Maryland.2 This article will discuss other tools which may be
used in criminal discovery that are often overlooked and under-utilized
by defense attorneys.
It is important to start this discussion with two caveats. First, the
tools discussed in this article are not a substitute for the normal methods
of discovery, but may be used to supplement that discovery and provide
certain tactical advantages over these methods. Secondly, the use of all
these tools of discovery should not replace, but merely be a component
of a very thorough independent investigation by the defense of all of the
facts involved in the capital case.
I. SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
A subpoena duces tecum is available under Rule 3A: 12 of the Rules
of the Supreme Court of Virginia "for the production of writings or
objects" that are "material to the proceedings and are in the possession
of a person not a party to the action." 3 It is normally easy to determine
what materials fit within the "writings and objects" requirement of this
rule, thus there is no case law on this point in Virginia. There also has been
little problem determining who is "a party to the action." 4 The most
litigated element of this rule is that documents that are sought be
"material to the proceedings." The leading case for determining mate-
riality in the context of a subpoena duces tecum is Cox v. Common-
wealth.5 In this case the defendant, the Treasurer of the City of Fairfax,
was charged with embezzlement and sought a subpoena duces tecum for
the production of certain documents from four banks which contained
information regarding the accounts of the City of Fairfax. The subpoena
was issued but a large percentage of the requested documents were not
I Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:11.
2 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:12.
4 See Patterson v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 1, 348 S.E.2d 285,
290 (1986) (question was raised whether the objects requested by a
subpoena duces tecum were within the possession of the Commonwealth
or a third party, but it was not necessary to decide this issue).
5 227 Va. 324, 315 S.E.2d 228 (1984).
6 Cox v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 324, 326, 315 S.E.2d 228, 229
(1984). This right is established by Va. Const. art. I, § 8.
7 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
provided to the defense by the banks. The defense then asked for a
continuance, but the trial court determined that the requested documents
were not "material."
On appeal Cox claimed that the lack of access to records material to
her defense denied her the right "to call for evidence in her favor as
guaranteed by the Constitution of Virginia." 6 The Supreme Court of
Virginia agreed and stated that this right applied to the procurement of
documentary evidence.
In response to the holding by the trial court that the documents
sought by the defendant were not material to her case, the court estab-
lished the standard of materiality to be applied in these situations. The
court adopted the standard established by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Agurs7 and Bowman Dairy Co. v. United
States,8 which requires that "a substantial basis for claiming materiality
exists" and that the materials in the hands of third parties "could be used
at trial." If the records sought meet both of these requirements, they are
the proper subject of a subpoena duces tecum. The court in Cox found that
the trial court had erred, that the records were material, and that "denying
the defendant access thereto violated her constitutional right 'to call for
evidence in [her] favor."' 9
The Virginia Court of Appeals has further defined the limits of this
standard. In Farish v. Commonwealth the court determined that a
subpoena duces tecum "should not be used when it is not intended to
produce evidentiary materials but is intended as a 'fishing expedition' in
the hope of uncovering information material to the defendant's case." t 0
In Gibbs v. Commonwealth the court clarified that the documents or
objects obtainable by a subpoena duces tecum are not limited to those
"that are admissible in evidence but may be issued for any writings or
objects that are 'material to the proceedings."' 11 The court's basis for
this decision rests on a person's constitutional right "to call for evidence
in his favor" 12 and the fact that this guarantee includes "the right to
prepare for trial which, in turn, includes the right to interview material
8 341 U.S. 214, 221 (1951).
9 Cox v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. at 328-29, 315 S.E.2d at
230-31.
10 2 Va. App. 627, 630, 346 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1986).
11 16 Va. App. 697, 698, 432 S.E.2d 514, 515 (1993).
12 Va. Const. art. I, § 8. It is critically important that objection to
a denial of a subpoena duces tecum also be made under the compulsory
process clause found in the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
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witnesses and to ascertain the truth." 13 Cox requires that this ability to
"call for evidence" shall include demonstrative evidence. Through this
analysis, the court determined that "[m]ateriality may be determined by
the effect of a document on the preparation and presentation of an
accused's case ' 14 and that, "[t]o the extent that these [documents]...
tend 'to establish a probability or improbability ... of a fact in issue' at
the defendant's trial, they are material." 15 Finally the court held that the
error by the trial court of denying the defendant access to this material
information is only reversible error upon a showing of prejudice.
16
According to the language of the rules and case law, the subpoena
duces tecum has many advantages over Rule 3A: 11 and Brady material
discovery. Comparing the language of these two rules, it is apparent that
the breadth of what may be discovered by use of the subpoena is greater
than that of Rule 3A:l 1 discovery. 17 A subpoena may be issued to any
person not a party to the action, while 3A: 11 discovery is limited to the
Commonwealth's attorney and only to those materials within the "pos-
session, custody or control of the Commonwealth." 18 Another advan-
tage apparent from the language of the rules is that there is no requirement
for reciprocal discovery established when requesting a subpoena duces
tecum. Thus if records were necessary to prepare a defense and were
available from either the Commonwealth or a third party, the better
approach would be to seek a subpoena for these records, thus not
triggering the mandatory reciprocity of Rule 3A: 11.
Based on Cox and Gibbs, another advantage is the time in which this
tool is available. It is not necessary to wait for the Commonwealth's
attorney to compile all of theinformation and comply with any discovery
order. At the earliest time that the defense determines that someone other
than the Commonwealth has any materials that would "tend to establish
a probability or improbability of a fact in issue," the subpoena should be
available. Additionally, because of the emphasis these cases placed on
the constitutional right to call for evidence, there is a strong case for
claiming that these subpoenas should be issued as soon as materiality is
shown. Having the time required to receive and use the evidence
requested in preparing for the a criminal proceeding is at the heart of the
truth finding process.
This showing of materiality required is not an onerous standard.
Experienced Virginia defense attorneys report that materiality is rarely
questioned and that there is little difficultly in obtaining the issuance of
a subpoena duces tecum. 19 As noted above, the emphasis by the courts
in analyzing this standard has focused on the ability of the accused to call
for evidence in the preparation of his defense. When a trial court
considers the affidavit of the accused that shows that the requested
"writings or objects are material to the proceedings," the court should
look at the substantial basis for claiming materiality and how a denial
would "prejudice" the accused in preparing his defense in determining
whether the requested documents are material. This focus is forward
looking, determining only the effect such requested information would
have on the preparation of the case by the defendant.
13 Bobo v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 774,779,48 S.E.2d 213,215
(1948).
14 Gibbs v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 697,699,432 S.E.2d 514,
515 (1993) (citing White v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 99, 103, 402
S.E.2d 692, 695 (1991)).
15 Gibbs, 16 Va. App. at 701,432 S.E.2d at 516 (quotingFerrell v.
Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 380, 388, 399 S.E.2d 614, 619 (1990)).
16 Gibbs, 16 Va. App. at 701,432 S.E.2d at 516 (citing Conway v.
Commonwealth, 12Va.App. 711,716,407 S.E.2d310, 312-313 (1991)).
17 See Gibbs, 16 Va. App. at 699-700,432 S.E.2d at 515-16.; Cox,
227 Va. at 328, 315 S.E.2d at 230.
18 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:l l(b).
When appellate courts have addressed denials of these requests,
they have applied a backward looking approach, sometimes confusing
the issue of what is material by focusing on outcome determination. Thus
confusion has arisen as to what standard of prejudice must be shown. In
Patterson v. Commonwealth the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the
standard created by UnitedStates v.Bagley20 was adopted in Virginia for
determining the effect of a denial of a subpoena duces tecum request.
21
Under this standard, the evidence requested would be material "only if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome."'22 In Gibbs v. Commonwealth the Virginia Court
of Appeals did not refer to the Bagley standard, but only to the fact that
denial of the information requested by a subpoena duces tecum is not
reversible error absent a showing of prejudice, citing Conway v. Com-
monwealth as the standard for determining whether prejudice exists.
23
Conway, however, applied a harmless error standard, rather than the
Bagley standard. The two standards differ as to who has the burden of
proof. If the Conway court had applied theBagley standard, the appellant
would have failed to carry the burden of proving that denial of the
materials requested would have undermined confidence in the outcome.
However, without discussing the burden of proof, the Conway court
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of prejudice. In
any event, appellate review standards governing prejudice are employed
only to judge the effect of what is concededly an error. Trial courts, who
cannot forsee the effect of their rulings on the outcome of the proceeding,
presumably will not commit error in the hope that it will later be found
harmless. Thus the CoxlGibbs standard will apply pre-trial.
These differing standards of finding prejudice established by the
same court leave unsettled what must be shown to challenge a denial of
information requested by a subpoena duces tecum. What is clear from
both of these opinions however, is that the trial court really has broad
discretion in applying a standard of materiality that is not hard to meet.
Thus the focus of defense counsel should be on meeting the initial
materiality requirement at the trial court. This requires only that the
affidavit submitted when requesting the subpoena contain a "substantial
basis for materiality" of the information, that it contain a basis for
materiality that rises above the level of mere "surmise and speculation,"
and that contains enough to satisfy a trial court that the request is
something more than a "fishing expedition." 24 These are the minimal
levels that the basis for the request of a subpoena must meet so that it may
survive a challenge to quash by the Commonwealth or the party to whom
it is addressed. In the final analysis, it is important to remember that a
request that is properly drawn will rarely be challenged, thus making the
subpoena duces tecum a readily available discovery tool.
Since a subpoena duces tecum is not specifically directed at a party
to the proceeding, a disadvantage is the absence of a continuing duty to
19 For further information concerning securing a subpoena duces
tecum and the practical applications of this alternative discovery tool,
contact David Baugh, Esq., P.O. Box 12137, Richmond, Va. 23241.
20 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
21 Patterson v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 1, 8, 348 S.E.2d 285,
289 (1986).
22 Id. (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)).
23 Gibbs, 16 Va. App. at 701, 432 S.E.2d at 516 (citing Conway v,
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 711,407 S.E.2d 310 (1991)).
24 Farish v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. at 629-30,346 S.E.2d al
737-38.
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disclose by the person having custody of the requested material.
25
Without this duty, it is imperative that defense counsel be assured that the
documents are in the possession of the third party at the time the request
is made.
The fact that a subpoena duces tecum may only be directed at
persons not a party to the action, while normal criminal discovery under
Rule 3A:l 1 and Brady are aimed at the Commonwealth's attorney show
why this tool could not replace the normal methods of discovery.
However, these factors also show how failure to utilize this tool could
cause the loss of valuable information that is vital to preparing a defense
in a capital murder case. Because of the breadth of the topics that will be
litigated in a capital murder trial,26 the lower materiality standard
available under the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is invaluable in
investigating all the areas that will be tried.
II. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
There are two Freedom of Information Acts available to every
defense attorney in Virginia: the United States Freedom of Information
Act (US FOIA)27 and the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VA
FOIA).28 Both of these acts are potential tools to supplement normal
methods of discovery in a capital murder case.29
Both the greatest asset and the greatest liability of using these acts
as discovery tools for a criminal proceedings is that these acts were not
established directly for discoverypurposes.The statedpurpose of the VA
FOIA is to ensure "the people of the Commonwealth ready access to
records in the custody of public officials and free entry to meetings of
public bodies wherein the business of the people is being conducted."30
The most important reason that this is an advantage is that requests
for information under either FOIA do not need to be tied to any
proceeding. This affects the timing of the request and the standing
necessary to make the request. Traditional discovery tools must be
requested by motion within the time provided for such motions and
completed within a certain period in relation to the proceeding in which
it was requested. An FOIA request may be made before charges are even
brought or after the period for conventional discovery has expired.
Though defense counsel may not learn of potential capital charges until
25 See Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:l 1(g):
If, after disposition of a motion filed under this Rule, and
before or during trial, counsel or a party discovers additional
material previously requested or falling within the scope of an
order previously entered, that is subject to discovery or inspec-
tion under this Rule, he shall promptly notify the otherparty or
his counsel or the court of the existence of the additional
material.
There is no equivalentprovision in Rule 3A: 12, which allows for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.
26 Examples of the greater breadth of relevant evidence in a capital
case compared to a non-capital criminal proceeding include: (1) Presen-
tation of unadjudicated acts of the accused by the Commonwealth and (2)
Presentation of mitigation evidence by the defense.
27 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-55 (1988).
28 Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.1-340.1 to -346.1 (Supp. 1994).
29 For comprehensive analysis of using the US FOIA for criminal
discovery, see Note, The Freedom of Information Act-A Potential
Alternative to Conventional Criminal Discovery, Am. Crim. L. Rev.,
Vol. 14, pg. 73 (1976). For other articles on use of FOIA in discovery,
see Watkins, Using the Freedom of Information Act as a Discovery
they are formally brought, the FOIA still allows for the request of
information at the earliest stages of the proceeding.
The standing requirement is also very minimal for obtaining infor-
mation under the FOLA. For the US FOIA, an agency must make
requested records available to "any person," 31 while the VA FOIA
requires that "official records shall be open to inspection and copying by
any citizens of this Commonwealth."'32 Thus there is no need for a
proceeding to be filed or that the person requesting information be aparty
to any action. This further means that there is no materiality requirement.
As long as the requirements of the statute are met, the intended use is of
no importance to the fulfillment of the FOIA request.
The fact that there is no materiality requirement shifts the burden of
proving that the information should not be disclosed to the government.
Under the VA FOIA, the requested material must be disclosed unless the
Government can demonstrate that it falls within a particular exemp-
tion.33 In making these determinations, the FOIA "shall be liberally
construed" and "any exception or exemption from applicability shall be
narrowly construed."'34 This can be important, for in normal discovery
materiality must be established for documents of which the contents are
unknown. The reverse is true under the FOIA, where the right to the
material is assumed without any initial burden on the person making the
request.
Another important advantage of the FOIA is that there is little room
for discretion by the courts. If the requirements of the statute are met and
no exemption applies, the information must be given. Under Rule 3A: 11,
the defendant is entitled to certain discovery,35 but in all other discovery
matters, the trial court has wide discretion. The limited authority to deny
FOIA requests should mean that more information is released.
The last important advantage is that FOIA requests, like the sub-
poena duces tecum, are not reciprocal. Thus if the same information
could be obtained from the Commonwealth or through some public
body, the FOIA request would be the optimal choice so that no informa-
tion would have to be disclosed in return for the release of the information
requested.
The disadvantages also stem from the fact that these acts were not
designed as discovery tools. The first disadvantage is the difficulty in
obtaining prompt release of the information. Each of the acts contain a
time frame in which the public body must respond to any FOIA request.
36
Device, 1994 Ark. L. Notes 59, pg. 59 (1994); Tomlinson, Use of the
Freedom of InformationActforDiscoveryPurposes, 43 Md. L. Rev. 119
(1984).
30 Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-340.1.
31 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).
32 Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-342(A).
33 Under Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-342(B), there are fifty-six (56)
exclusions from the requirement that all official records be open to
inspection and copying by citizens. Even if requested material falls
within one of these exclusions, the custodian of these materials may
disclose them "in his discretion, except where such disclosure is prohib-
ited by law."
34 Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-340.
35 Under Rule 3A: 11, the defendant is entitled to any statements or
confessions, written orrecorded, by the defendant and certain reports that
related to the defendant or the alleged victim made in connection with the
case. Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:11.
36 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (upon request, agency shall determine
within 10 days whether to comply with request; agency shall immedi-
ately notify the person making the request of such determination and of
their right to appeal an adverse determination to the head of the agency;
determination must be made on such an appeal within 20 days); Va. Code
Ann. § 2.1-342(A) (custodian must respond to citizens request within
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These bodies may ask for extensions in exceptional circumstances. If the
body refuses to provide the information, an FOIA suit mustbe filed under
the US FOIA. Under the VA FOIA, a petition for injunction or manda-
mus must be filed.37 The VA FOIA recognizes that this process could
become time consuming, and requires that the petition be heard within
seven days during the term of the court, or have precedence on the docket
of a court not in session.38 Even with these mechanisms, the actual time
for receiving the documents may be extended beyond the time when they
would be most helpful. Thus if this tool is to be used, it should be initiated
at the earliest possible instance.
A disadvantage that arises merely from enforcing the right to the
information is the potential maintenance of a separate proceeding in
another court while preparing for the capital trial. If the public body
should refuse to provide the information, it must be determined if it is
worth the effort to carry out such a collateral matter or if it would be
possible to initiate that matter in the same court in which the capital case
will be heard.
Pursuing this avenue of discovery may also be costly. The public
body is entitled to a reasonable fee to cover compiling and copying costs
in responding to the FOIA request.39 The possibility of litigating any
request could substantially increase this cost. It is possible that none of
the time or expense in pursuing such request will be reimbursed to
appointed counsel. This is very important in the capital murder context
since most defendants are indigent and are represented by appointed
counsel.
Other disadvantages of using the FOIA for discovery are that there
is no continuing duty to disclose information and no duty to "create or
prepare aparticular requested record if it does not already exist."40 These
disadvantages again emphasize the importance of an independent inves-
tigation to determine as specifically as possible what information a
public body may have within its custody and in what form they hold that
information.
Regardless of the advantages and disadvantages of FOIA as com-
pared to traditional discovery, sometimes it is impossible to obtain
important records through traditional methods of discovery. A possible
list of that type of information includes: witness lists, policy guidelines
of the prosecutor's office, and statistical information. For information
such as this, the FOIA may be the only avenue to obtain this informa-
tion.41 In this situation, the only question should be whether the potential
expense outweighs the potential benefit of the information.
The key to using either FOIA is to determine the strength of the
argument that the requested information does not fall within any excep-
tion or exemption within the statute. There is no case law in Virginia
dealing with use of the VA FOIA in criminal cases and the language of
the US FOIA and that of the VA FOIA is not comparable, thus federal
case law is not analogous. This could work either way for defense
counsel. With no case law to overcome, defense counsel is free to rely
upon the liberal purpose of the FOIA in general and argue that exemp-
tions should not apply to information that they request. However, the
public body which receives the request, and courts that review denials of
five work days after receipt of the request by the public body; if public
body determines that it is "practically impossible" to provide the re-
quested record or determine whether they are available within the five-
work-day period, the body may inform the citizen and may have an
additional seven work days in which to provide a response).
37 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-346.
38 Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-346.
39 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii); Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-342.
40 Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-342(A).
41 For more information on the use of theUS FOIA for material that
such requests, will have more discretion since there is no case law to
restrain them.
Ml. RIGHT TO REPORTS AND INVESTIGATION BY
STATE LABORATORIES
Virginia Code section 2.1-434.11 guarantees that
[u]pon the request of any person accused of a crime or upon the
request of an accused person's attorney, the Division of
Forensic Science or the Division of Consolidated Laboratory
Services shall furnish to the accused or his attorney the results
of any investigation which has been conducted by it and which
is related in any way to a crime for which such person is
accused.42
The statute also authorizes the attorney for the accused, if "in good
faith he believes that a scientific investigation may be relevant to the
criminal charge," to move the court for an order requiring the Division
of Forensic Science (DFS) or the Division of Consolidated Laboratory
Services (DCLS) to complete the requested investigation.
There are several advantages that this section has over normal
discovery under Rule 3A:l 1. First, for the reports already completed by
these labs, the defense must only "request" the reports and the labs
"shall"provide them to the accused orhis attorney, while a motion must
be made for Rule 3A:11 discovery. When requesting that a scientific
investigation be completed by a lab, a motion must be made, but that
motion "shall be heard ex parte," unlike Rule 3A: 11 discovery mo-
tions.43
A second advantage is that requests made under this section do not
open reciprocal discovery, unlike Rule 3A:L. If an investigation is
requested and conducted, the Commonwealth may, upon request, "be
furnished the results of the scientific investigation."'44 However, this is
not truly reciprocal in that only the report is available and no further
information is required to be given because of the request.
A third advantage is that these requests may be made when there is
an "accused." This presumably occurs upon arrest or return of the
indictment. Rule 3A:l 1 requires that there be "a felony prosecution in
circuit court." Thus the request should be available earlier than regular
discovery.
Another advantage is the language of this section is slightly broader
than Rule 3A:ll, in that it requires the release of any reports that are
"related in any way to a crime for which [the] person is accused."'45 Rule
3A: 11 requires that "relevant" scientific reports be provided if they are
"known by the Commonwealth's attorney to be within the possession,
custody or control of the Commonwealth.'
46
Finally, when a court hears the exparte motion of the defense when
requesting a scientific investigation, the court "shall, after a hearing upon
the motion and being satisfied as to the correctness of the certification,
order that the same be performed." 47 This language shows that the
would not be discoverable through criminal discovery, see Note, supra
note 29, at 139-59.
42 Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-434.11 (Supp. 1994). This section was





46 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:11.
47 Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-434.11 (emphasis added).
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hearing should look only to the validity of defense counsel's certification
that in good faith he believes that the investigation requested may be
relevant. It does not seem to require that the defense must prove the
relevance, only that they truly believe that it may be relevant. This is a
lower threshold than is required by Rule 3A:l 1 discovery.
A disadvantage of using this method of obtaining a scientific
investigation, rather than the use of an Ake expert,48 is that any report
produced by the lab in conducting the investigation may be obtained by
the Commonwealth. This provision is important in determining whether
this section should be used. If the evidence leading to the investigation
request is important enough to the case, the investigation should be
conducted by an expert granted under an Ake motion for expert assis-
tance. If this approach is taken, nothing produced by the investigation
will be discoverable by the Commonwealth. However, there will be
instances where the investigation will be merely duplicative of tests
already conducted by the Commonwealth or where the harm of a report
that is counter to its anticipated outcome would cause minimal damage
if presented against the defense. An example that illustrates such a case:
A soil sample was taken from the automobile of the accused and the test
completed by the DFS shows that such a sample was consistent with soil
found at the grave site of his alleged murder victim. This would be a good
time for the defense to request that a soil sample from the accused's
driveway be tested to determine if it was also consistent with that found
in the automobile.49 This would be an appropriate use of this section
because if the samples were found to be inconsistent, the harm resulting
from disclosure of the report to the Commonwealth would be minimal.
Another example of an appropriate use is provided in Weeks v.
Commonwealth, where defense counsel, hoping to minimize the ability
of the Commonwealth to use "vileness" as an aggravating factor for a
capital murder charge, attempted to determine whether the police officer
allegedly murdered by the accused was killed instantaneously. 50
This provision is the main cause for the under-utilization of this
section by defense counsel. A Symposium of Science and the Rules of
Legal Procedure held in 1983 detailed that only four requests for such
assistance have been documented in the previous decade.51 The reasons
provided by the panel for the limited use were the report disclosure
provision and defense counsel's distrust of laboratory personnel, whom
they considered to be "employees of a police laboratory."'52 This
provision should require that defense counselbe assured of the effect that
a negative report from a requested investigation may have on the defense,
but it should not totally preclude defense counsel from utilizing this tool
when it is determined that such an effect would be minimal.
48 Ake v. Oklaholma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (held that there is a
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to expert assistance when that
assistance is a basic tool, essential to an adequate defense). For a
discussion of the showing required to obtain expert assistance underAke,
see case summary of Weeks v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.
49 This example was contained in seminar materials provided at a
1994 Capital Defense Workshop sponsored by the Virginia Bar.
50 248 Va. 460,450 S.E.2d 379 (1994). The investigation was not
conducted because the trial court placed a requirement on the accused
beyond that contained in the statute and took the motion under advise-
IV. OBTAINING CRIMINAL RECORDS
The Virginia Code allows a defendant in a felony case to obtain
criminal records from the Central Criminal Records Exchange (CCRE).
53
This information would be useful for impeachment of the
Commonwealth's witnesses. The showing that must be made to obtairi
these records is that they "may be relevant to such a case," 54 which is
broader than the "relevance" requirement of Rule 3A: 11. Also, the
motion for this request may be made ex parte.
The difficulty in making such a request will come in determining
what records should be requested, when the witness list of the Common-
wealth is unknown to the defense. The Circuit Court of the City of
Winchester addressed this issue in Commonwealth v. Johnson.55 In that
case the defendant requested a witness list from the Commonwealth so
that the defendant could obtain criminal conviction information on those
witnesses. When this request was denied, the defendant proposed that the
Commonwealth have the criminal records of its witnesses available so
that such information could be given to the defense when each witness
was called. 56 The court held that it is the burden of the defendant to
determine who may be called by the Commonwealth and to seek their
criminal records through an exparte motion under Code section 19.2-
389(A).57
This section was also discussed in Weeks v. Commonwealth.58 In
that case, the trial court failed to grant the motion for the records
requested by the defendant. The Supreme Court of Virginia determined
that even assuming the right to obtain these records should have been
granted, the denial was not reversible error because the record did not
show that the defendant's right to defend himself had been prejudiced.
59
The key in obtaining such information, as it was with a subpoena
duces tecum, is to make a strong showing that the information is or may
be relevant within the exparte motion to the trial court, thus avoiding the
pitfalls of the prejudice review by the appellate courts. Since the standard
is low the information will normally be given by the trial court.
V. CONCLUSION
From this analysis, it is quite apparent that their are many strategic
and practical decisions to be made when determining whether to use a
subpoena duces tecum or FOIA to supplement the traditional methods of
discovery. The key to properly utilizing all the tools available in discov-
ery is being aware that they are available, what the aim of each is, and the
way in which they compare to the other methods of discovery. Counsel
should apply these considerations to the specific facts of each case to
determine the best methods of discovery in each case.
ment. This motion was never renewed. See case summary of Weeks v.
Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
51 101 F.R.D. 599, 646 (1983).
52 Id.
53 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-389(A) (Supp. 1993).
54 Id.
55 7 Va. Cir. Ct. Opinions 251 (1985).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 252.
58 248 Va. 460, 450 S.E.2d 379 (1994).
59 Id. at 472, 450 S.E.2d at 387.
